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Abstract: It is a widely held principle that no one is able to do something that would require the past to have
been different from how it actually is. This principle of the fixity of the past has been presented in numerous
ways, playing a crucial role in arguments for logical and theological fatalism, and for the incompatibility
of causal determinism and the ability to do otherwise. I will argue that, assuming bivalence, this principle
is in conflict with standard views about knowledge and the semantics for ‘actually’. I also consider many
possible responses to the argument.
1. Introduction
It is widely held that an agent S is able to perform an action only if it is possible for S to perform
it. In other words, S is able to φ only if there is a possible world in which S φ -s. This much is
philosophical orthodoxy. But not any possible world will do to bear witness to the claim that S is
able to φ . A number of philosophers also contend that in order for S to be able to φ , say, in the
actual world, a possible world bearing witness to this claim must be exactly like the actual world
until the very moment, or a bit before, S φ -s. For, despite all the things one is able to do in a given
situation, no one is able to do something that would require the past to have been different from
how it actually is.
This principle of the fixity of the past has been articulated and defended by philosophers in
various ways, playing a crucial role in arguments for logical and theological fatalism, and for the
incompatibility of causal determinism and the ability to do otherwise. One among many ways of
formulating this principle more precisely is as follows:
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(FP) For any action φ , agent S, times t and t ′ (where t ≤ t ′) and possible world w, S is able
at t to φ at t ′ in w only if there is a possible world w′ with the same past as that of w up
to t in which S φ -s at t ′.1
I will argue that (FP) is at odds with standard views about knowledge and the semantics for ‘actu-
ally’. The principle of bivalence, according to which every proposition is either true or false, will
be assumed throughout the argument.
2. The argument
First, a lemma is required. Let ‘2’, ‘A’ and ‘K’ stand for ‘necessarily’, ‘actually’ and ‘it was, is,
or will be known that’, respectively, while ‘⊃’ is the material conditional. Then:
(1) q ⊃ ((q ⊃ p)⊃ p)
(2) Ap ⊃2Ap
(3) 2(K p ⊃ p)
——————————–
(4) Ap ⊃2(K(Ap ⊃ p)⊃ p)
(1) is a tautology in classical propositional logic, (2) is an axiom of standard modal logics of
‘actually’ and (3) is the orthodox principle that knowledge is necessarily factive. From (1) one can
derive 2(q⊃ ((q⊃ p)⊃ p)) by the rule of necessitation, from which 2q⊃2((q⊃ p)⊃ p) follows
by the modal axiom K and modus ponens, and so 2Ap ⊃2((Ap ⊃ p)⊃ p) follows by substituting
‘Ap’ for ‘q’. From this and (2) one can derive Ap⊃2((Ap⊃ p)⊃ p) by truth-functional reasoning,
and from (3) one can derive Ap ⊃ 2(K(Ap ⊃ p) ⊃ (Ap ⊃ p)) by truth-functional reasoning and
substitution of ‘(Ap ⊃ p)’ for ‘p’. The conclusion, (4), follows from the previous two claims in the
modal logic K.
1For different presentations, defences and applications of the idea that the past is fixed, see Pike 1977, Ginet 1990:
102–3, Fischer 1994, 2016 and Holliday 2012, to name a few.
2
For the main argument assume the following three premises, all of which are evaluated at the
actual world, where t ≤ t ′ ≤ t ′′:
(5) S actually φ -s at t ′′.
(6) S is able at t ′ to not φ at t ′′.
(7) It was known that (S actually φ -s at t ′′ only if S φ -s at t ′′) at t.
Premise (5) requires only that S φ -s at a certain time in the actual world, while premise (6) requires,
additionally, that S was able to do otherwise. Say I have just raised my hand. Then I have actually
raised my hand. But I was able to do otherwise. For example, I was able to put my hand down
instead. So it is true that I have actually raised my hand and that I was able to do otherwise. This
is enough in order to satisfy (5) and (6). Now, say that the day before I raised my hand you came
to know the following: Fabio will actually raise his hand tomorrow only if he will raise his hand
tomorrow. Of course, you were able to know this in advance, and irrespective of whether I actually
did end up raising my hand or not. For if p is the contingent truth that Fabio will raise his hand
tomorrow, what you came to know is the conditional Ap ⊃ p, a contingent but a priori truth. You
could have come to know this, for instance, by simply thinking about semantics, while using my
raising my hand as an example. This is enough in order to satisfy (7). Now, given the formalism
introduced before, (8) follows from (4) and (5):
(8) Necessarily, if it was, is, or will be known that (S actually φ -s at t ′′ only if S φ -s at t ′′),
then S φ -s at t ′′.
And (9) follows from (FP) and (6):
(9) There is a possible world w′ with the same past as that of the actual world up to t ′ in
which S does not φ at t ′′.
Obviously, though, given (9), (10) also holds:
(10) It is not the case that S φ -s at t ′′ in w′.
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But since w′ and the actual world share the same past up to t ′, (11) follows from (7) and (9):
(11) It was known that (S actually φ -s at t ′′ only if S φ -s at t ′′) at t in w′.
Now (12) clearly follows from (11):
(12) It was, is, or will be known that (S actually φ -s at t ′′ only if S φ -s at t ′′) in w′.
However, (13) follows from (8) and (12), contradicting (10):
(13) S φ -s at t ′′ in w′.
We have thus arrived at a contradiction given (FP), (4) and the trio (5), (6) and (7). It is therefore
not possible for all of them to be true. What could have gone wrong? The argument does not
appear to have any logical flaws; hence, to avoid the above contradiction, it seems that one will
have to deny at least one of the premises. But which one?
Before examining some possible responses to the argument, let us consider a more informal
version of it that should make its counter-intuitive consequences more pronounced. Consider, then,
the following scenario:
Smith and Jones have both applied for a certain job and a decision is yet to be made.
Smith knows that he will actually be offered the job only if he will be offered the job,
though this trifling piece of knowledge has no effect on his nerves. The final decision
on who gets offered the job is entirely up to Alice, the company’s CEO. A week later,
after careful consideration, Alice thinks both candidates are equally strong, competent
and appropriate for the job, though she must now make a choice: she must offer the
job to either Smith or Jones. And because Alice thinks the candidates are too similar,
she decides to choose between them at random.
Say Alice is about to make her choice. Is she able to offer Smith the job? Intuitively, yes. Is she
able to offer Jones the job? Likewise, the answer appears to be yes. So, whatever she is about to
do, she is now able to do otherwise. Suppose, then, that Alice will actually offer Smith the job. If
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she was indeed able to do otherwise, given (FP), there is a possible world w′ with the same past
as that of the actual world up to t, say, the moment in which Alice makes her choice, in which she
does not offer Smith the job – say, she offers it to Jones instead. And since she will actually offer
Smith the job it follows from (4) that necessarily, if Smith knows that he will actually be offered
the job only if he will be offered the job, then he will be offered the job. But Smith came to know
this before t, and so w′ is a world in which Smith knows that he will actually be offered the job
only if he will be offered the job, from which it follows that w′ is also a world in which he will be
offered the job. Contradiction. Therefore, there is no possible world w′ with the same past as that
of the actual world up to t in which Alice does not offer Smith the job. A similar argument can be
made if we suppose instead that Alice will actually offer Jones the job and the scenario is modified
accordingly so that Jones is now the one who gets to know the relevant a priori truth.
Taken as an argument against (6), for instance, the present argument tells us that if anyone
knew in advance that actually p only if p, where p is any true-in-the-actual-world proposition
‘about’ a future action of S, S is not able to do otherwise. But this is unacceptable. It might well
be that, tomorrow, Biden will actually have ice cream for lunch. But he surely has the ability to do
otherwise, even if I know, today, that he will actually have ice cream for lunch tomorrow only if he
will do just so. To put it plainly: whatever Biden is able to do tomorrow does not depend on what
I can know today from the armchair. In light of such consequences, one does well in examining
multiple ways of responding to this argument.
3. Possible responses
Let us first take a closer look at some of the premises in the ‘knowledge lemma’ leading to (4). (1)
is a tautology, and as such it is unimpeachable. Some may object to (2) by arguing that ‘actually’
does not display the required rigidifying reading in natural language. All the same, there is clearly
a well-known philosophical reading of ‘actually’ that is modeled in the usual possible-worlds se-
mantics with an operator that satisfies (2).
With respect to (3), its rejection appears to be implausible. Of course, it might well be that
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what is indicated by the present argument is that there could be knowledge of falsehoods. But
this would be difficult to motivate, as there would have to be significant reasons for denying (3)
instead of (FP), for instance. Moreover, the main argument can be reformulated with different
verbs that are likewise plausibly factive, such as ‘establishes’, and the premises would have been
just as compelling.
Yet another response would involve rejecting what Chalmers (2011: 413) calls the face-value
view of ‘actually’. Consider the proposition expressed by ‘Ap’, where p is any proposition. Ac-
cording to the face-value view of ‘actually’, that proposition was, is, or will be known just in case
what is expressed by ‘KAp’ is true, and it is necessary just in case what is expressed by ‘2Ap’ is
true. By rejecting the face-value view, one could block the knowledge lemma without allowing
for counterexamples to (3). Chalmers 2011: 416–17 sketches various alternative treatments of ‘ac-
tually’ for those who may want to reject the face-value view, including an ambiguity analysis on
which ‘Ap’ expresses distinct propositions in epistemic and modal contexts, and a pluralist view
on which different readings of ‘actually’ may satisfy different premises of the argument. I will
neither repeat nor discuss those alternatives any further, though some may be live options for those
who would like to hold on to (3) and (FP). Notwithstanding, all that is needed here is one reading
of ‘actually’ on which the argument is sound. A philosophical reading that suggests itself is, for
instance, ‘in this very world’; and it seems that both (2) and (3) hold under this reading.2
Perhaps instead of rejecting one or more premises from the knowledge lemma, defenders of
(FP) might target some step of the main argument, thereby holding on to the standard semantics
for ‘actually’ and the assumption that knowledge is necessarily factive.
Premise (5) says that S actually φ -s at t ′′, where ‘actually’ is formalized with ‘A’. As such, (5)
appears unobjectionable. But, given (6), the argument also requires that S be able at t ′ to refrain
from φ -ing at t ′′ (recall that t ≤ t ′ ≤ t ′′). And some might adhere to a strong indeterministic view
according to which S is able at t ′ to refrain from φ -ing at t ′′ only if it is not yet true that S will φ
at t ′′. A case in point: Alice is able to offer Jones the job only if it is not yet true that she will
2This reading is also suggested by Chalmers (2011: 417).
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actually offer Smith the job. A view of this sort would require the future to be open in a very
strong sense, according to which some propositions about the future are neither true nor false. To
be sure, this view is not standard among defenders of arguments for logical or theological fatalism,
nor is it standard among defenders of arguments for the incompatibility of causal determinism
and the ability to do otherwise; and those are arguments in which (FP) plays a prominent role.
Nevertheless, this strong indeterministic view does provide a way out of some of those arguments.
For instance, if it is not (yet) true that Alice will offer Smith the job, then God does not foreknow
this, hence Alice may still be able to do otherwise.
Are there plausible responses to the argument that do not require a denial of bivalence? One
could reject (6) by claiming that human beings do not have the ability to do otherwise. One could
do that, for instance, by arguing that causal determinism is incompatible with the ability to do
otherwise, while arguing further that causal determinism is true. Alternatively, one could endorse
theological fatalism, arguing that the existence of an omniscient God who foreknows the future
is incompatible with human beings possessing the ability to do otherwise, while arguing further
that an omniscient God does in fact exist. Still, this does not diminish the strength of the present
argument. Once more, principles like (FP) play a prominent role in the arguments just mentioned.
But, more importantly, the present argument assumes neither causal determinism nor the existence
of an omniscient God. Thus the argument should be puzzling even for those who already reject
(6): if S was not able to do otherwise, it surely is not because someone already knew a triviality
such as what is involved in (7).
A rejection of (7) is, furthermore, difficult to motivate in light of the standard reading of ‘ac-
tually’. It is widely believed that many propositions such as Ap ⊃ p can be known a priori, even
when they are only contingently true. An expected response from defenders of principles like (FP)
would consist in denying (11) instead. The defender of (FP) might contend that the fact that it was
known that (S actually φ -s at t ′′ only if S φ -s at t ′′) at t is past relative to t ′ at most in a qualified
sense, according to which it should not be held fixed by (FP).
One of the well-known responses for the problem of theological fatalism involves the adoption
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of a twofold distinction between facts. This is the distinction originally inspired by William of
Ockham, between hard and soft facts about times. A hard fact about a time is a temporally intrinsic
fact about that time, and so it is genuinely and strictly about that time. By contrast, a soft fact about
a time is a relational fact about that time, and so it is also about some other time. An Ockhamist
will contend that hard facts about past times are always held fixed in evaluating what an agent is
able to do in a given situation, and that soft facts about past times need not, in general, be fixed.3
It is controversial whether any adequate and precise characterization of the distinction between
temporally intrinsic and temporally relational facts about times has ever been offered. But it might
be useful to think of soft facts about the past as facts that somehow depend on the future in order
to obtain; hard facts about the past, by contrast, display no such dependence (see Todd 2013: 832).
For instance, while (h) is a hard fact about 1980, (s) is only a soft fact about 1980, as it depends on
the future (relative to 1980) in order to obtain:
(h) John Lennon was shot in 1980.
(s) John Lennon was shot in 1980, 41 years before I typed this sentence in 2021.
Moreover, I was very much able to prevent (s) from having obtained until moments ago, as I was
able to type a different sentence. So there is no reason to think (s) should have been held fixed
in evaluating what I was able to do until shortly before I typed that sentence. Consequently, the
Ockhamist will contend that the fixity of the past should be understood more properly as the fixity
of the hard past, in which case (FP) should be reformulated accordingly:
(FPh) For any action φ , agent S, times t and t ′ (where t ≤ t ′) and possible world w, S is able
at t to φ at t ′ in w only if there is a possible world w′ with the same hard past as that of
3This terminology comes from Pike (1966) and the characterization in terms of intrinsic and relational features is
typically made by Fischer (cf. 1994: 112, 2016: 12). The traditional Ockhamist solution to the problem of theological
fatalism then consists in arguing that facts about God’s past beliefs about the future are soft and not fixed. Here I use
‘Ockhamist’ to refer to anyone who adopts the distinction between hard and soft facts about times. Some Ockhamists
in this sense may still reject the original Ockhamist solution to the problem of theological fatalism, for instance, by
arguing that facts about God’s past beliefs must be held fixed under the relevant counterfactual circumstances. This
view is in fact widespread among incompatibilists such as Pike, Fischer and others.
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w up to t in which S φ -s at t ′.4
This Ockhamist proposal is effective against the present argument provided the fact that it was
known that (S actually φ -s at t ′′ only if S φ -s at t ′′) at t is only a soft fact about t that should not
be held fixed in considering what S is able to do at t ′.5 Recall that (11) follows from (7) and (9),
and that (9) follows from (FP) and (6). By adopting (FPh) instead of (FP), the Ockhamist will
effectively reject (9), since (9) does not follow from (FPh) and (6). Rather, what follows from
(FPh) and (6) is the following:
(9′) There is a possible world w′ with the same hard past as that of the actual world up to t ′
in which S does not φ at t ′′.
And if the fact that it was known that (S actually φ -s at t ′′ only if S φ -s at t ′′) at t is not a hard fact
about t, (11) will not follow from (7) and (9′). The argument is blocked. So, what of the Ockhamist
way out?
There seems to exist an important distinction between, say, belief facts and knowledge facts,
when the content of the attitude in question is about the future. Consider the following facts about
a time t:
(14) Smith believes at t that Alice will offer him the job in a week.
(15) Smith knows at t that Alice will offer him the job in a week.
It appears that (14) is a temporally intrinsic, hard fact about t. Even if Smith’s belief is about the
future, (14) does not seem to depend on it in order to obtain. But (15) tells us what (14) does and
more, namely, that Smith will be offered the job in a week. Whether (15) is a fact at t depends on
what happens at a time later than t, and so it appears to be a soft fact about t. Now consider the
following fact about t:
(16) Smith knows at t that Alice will actually offer him the job in a week only if she will
offer him the job in a week.
4This is roughly the principle offered in Fischer and Todd 2011: 103 sans the double time indexing, and which has
been variously defended by Fischer in other works.
5To be sure, some soft facts about the past are plausibly fixed. See Fischer and Todd 2011: 107-108.
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Does (16) depend on the future in order to obtain? It might seem so on the surface. Yet, on closer
inspection, (16) tells us nothing about Smith’s career prospects. Whether it is a fact that Smith
knows that a priori truth at t does not depend on whether he gets offered the job or not. In contrast
to (s) and (15), it is not in virtue of how the future turns out that (16) counts as a fact at the time in
question, for Smith does not count as knowing that a priori truth at t in virtue of what happens at a
later time. (16), therefore, seems to display no dependence on the future.
But one might object on the grounds that (16) does not wear its softness on its sleeve. Accord-
ing to the knowledge lemma, if Alice will actually offer Smith the job in a week then (16) strictly
implies, or entails, the contingent truth that she will do just so, thus (16) should be counted as a
soft fact about t after all. It depends on the future, as it entails something about it.
If entailing something about the future is indeed sufficient for the relevant notion of dependence
then one may argue that (16) is a soft fact about t, and the same would apply for (7). However,
this strategy faces several difficulties. First, note that the entailment in question is conditional
on the fact that Alice will actually offer Smith the job in a week. That is, it does not obtain
solely in virtue of the obtaining of (16). In this sense, (16) differs from (15), which alone entails
something about the future; likewise, (s) alone entails something about the future relative to the
time when John Lennon was shot. (16) thus seems to differ substantially from paradigmatic soft
facts. Second, one would need to motivate the view that (16) depends on the future in case Alice
actually offers Smith the job, but not, say, in case she picks Jones. After all, (16) only entails
that Alice will offer Smith the job in case she actually does so, and there is no reason to think
(16) depends on the future if it does not even entail something about it. Since, moreover, (16)
may count as a fact at t regardless of whether Alice picks Jones or Smith, whether (16) entails
something about the future under particular conditions would seem immaterial as to whether it is a
fact. Third, and more importantly, whether the notion of entailment plays any determining role in
the distinction between hard and soft facts is notoriously controversial. In fact, entailment criteria
for soft facthood have been subject to intense criticism by many champions of (FPh). Proponents
of arguments for logical and theological fatalism, and for the incompatibility of causal determinism
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and the ability to do otherwise, in particular, have long denied that entailing something about the
future should be sufficient for soft facthood.6 There are multiple reasons, therefore, in support of
the claim that (16) is plausibly a hard fact about t. By the same token, the fact that it was known
that (S actually φ -s at t ′′ only if S φ -s at t ′′) at t seems to be a hard fact about t, so (11) appears
to follow from (7) and (9′) after all. Endorsing (FPh) instead of (FP) thus seems to be ineffective
against the present argument.
There may well be other interesting ways of rejecting one or other step of the present argument
while holding on to either of (FP) or (FPh), though, under the assumption that every proposition is
either true or false, those will seem to involve rejecting either the standard semantics for ‘actually’
or standard views about knowledge, such as that knowledge is necessarily factive and that one can
know Ap ⊃ p when p concerns what someone is about to do.7
4. Conclusion
I have argued that the principle of the fixity of the past is at odds with standard views about knowl-
edge and the semantics for ‘actually’. But this principle, or its restriction to the hard past, plays a
crucial role in arguments for logical and theological fatalism, and arguments in favor of the incom-
patibility of causal determinism and the ability to do otherwise. Proponents of such arguments will
have to reject standard views about knowledge, or the standard semantics for ‘actually’. Alterna-
tively, they might try to find a revised principle of the fixity of the (hard) past that avoids the present
6Pike (1966), Fischer (1994, 2016), Fischer and Todd (2011), Todd (2013), among others, contend that facts about
God’s past beliefs concerning the future, for instance, should there be such facts, are not soft facts about the past,
even though they do entail something about the future in virtue of God’s infallibility. Todd in fact offers a non-modal,
‘identity-dependence’ account of soft facthood, in which, very roughly, something is a soft fact about t iff its identity
depends on the future relative to t (see Todd 2013: 839). But it seems that neither (16) nor (7) count as being soft
on this view. Since, for instance, (16) is a fact about knowledge, its identity might plausibly be thought to depend
on whether the known proposition is true. And although the modal status of the known proposition in question may
depend on whether its antecedent is true (Ap ⊃ p is contingent if p is contingently true in the actual world, and
necessary if p is false in the actual world), the mere fact that it is true would seem to exhibit no such dependence, as it
is true regardless of whether or not p is actually true.
7One might think principles such as (FP) hold for ordinary, non-agential powers, too. Say an earthquake just
happened, and a building is about to collapse. Then the building cannot remain standing if it collapses in every
possible world which is exactly like ours until, say, shortly after the earthquake. The present arguments would seem
just as effective with such generalized principles in place.
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argument, and which is sufficiently strong for the formulation of their arguments for fatalism (log-
ical or theological) and incompatibilism. As for those who would like to reject such arguments for
fatalism (logical or theological) and incompatibilism, while accepting bivalence, they might do so
by rejecting the principle of the fixity of the (hard) past and endorsing the aforementioned standard
views about knowledge as well as the standard semantics for ‘actually’.8
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